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BY THE POWER VESTED IN ME? LICENSING RELIGIOUS 
OFFICIALS TO SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGE IN THE AGE OF 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
ABSTRACT 
State recognition of same-sex marriage has presented significant new 
challenges to the law of religious freedom under the First Amendment. For 
example, all states license religious officials to solemnize civil marriage, a 
ceremony required for a valid marriage in all states. Could a state that has 
recognized same-sex marriage require its licensed religious officials to 
administer their licenses in such a way as not to discriminate against same-sex 
couples? Or would such a law violate the free exercise rights of that licensed 
religious official? Or, conversely, is the very practice of state licensing of 
religious officials to solemnize and enact civil marriage an impermissible 
establishment of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause? 
This Comment argues that (1) the Free Exercise Clause, as currently 
interpreted, does not protect licensed religious officials from a law forbidding 
them to discriminate against same-sex couples and (2) the typical marriage 
solemnization ceremony by a licensed religious official violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
This Comment also presents several solutions to remedy these paradoxical 
outcomes under the law. First, as to the Free Exercise Clause issue, this 
Comment proposes both statutory and judicial remedies that would exempt 
licensed religious officials from laws that prohibit discrimination in exercising 
marriage solemnization licenses. Second, as to the Establishment Clause issue, 
this Comment proposes narrow time, place, and manner restrictions on 
religious weddings and consecrations of civil marriages that would remedy the 
Establishment Clause violation without requiring states to strip religious 
officials of their licenses to solemnize civil marriage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
State recognition of same-sex marriage has presented significant new 
challenges to the law of religious freedom under the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. For example, all states employ sophisticated and nuanced 
marriage licensing regimes that license religious officials to solemnize civil 
marriages, a ceremonial act required for a valid marriage in all states.1 A 
growing number of states have recognized same-sex marriage while protecting 
their LGBT citizens from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.2 
But, in those latter states, some religious communities and officials refuse to 
marry same-sex couples.3 Many same-sex couples regard this refusal as 
discrimination.4 
Could a state require its licensed religious officials to administer their 
marriage licenses in accordance with the state’s nondiscrimination laws, and 
remove their licenses to marry anyone if they refuse? Would such a 
requirement violate the First Amendment free exercise rights of the religious 
official or of the official’s religious group? Such a law could force decisions by 
religious officials similar to those of Catholic churches in Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., which terminated their adoption 
services once those jurisdictions passed laws forcing the Church to consider 
same-sex couples as potential adoptive parents.5 
Alternatively, could a state go further and simply forbid religious officials 
to perform marriages altogether as a mandate of the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause? The Establishment Clause forbids certain delegations of 
government authority to religious officials as a violation of the principle of 
separation of church and state.6 Yet state regimes that license religious officials 
to enact civil marriage appear to do just that: delegate government authority to 
religious officials. 
 
 1 See infra notes 13−16. 
 2 See infra notes 26−27. 
 3 See, e.g., Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give 
Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons, VATICAN.VA (June 3, 2003), http://www. 
vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_ 
en.html. 
 4 See, e.g., Steve Siebold, Legalize Gay Marriage—Discrimination Is Not Christ-Like Behavior, 
HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (May 31, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-siebold/legalize-gay-
marriage_b_1560370.html (“The opposition to gay marriage is all about control and power . . . .”). 
 5 See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents Limit Freedom of Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/us/for-bishops-a-battle-over-whose-rights-prevail.html. 
 6 See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982).  
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Has a state created an impermissible establishment of religion when it 
licenses religious officials to solemnize civil marriages—an unconstitutional 
condition now finally exposed by the conflicts over same-sex marriage? If so, 
all state-given licenses would therefore need to be stripped from men and 
women of the cloth. Is this the beginning of another brave new world—the 
disestablishment of marriage? 
This Comment’s answer is no. Instead, this Comment first argues that 
while the Free Exercise Clause, as currently interpreted, does not entitle a 
religious official to discriminate against same-sex couples in the administration 
of his or her license according to his or her conscience, other legal remedies, 
based on statutes and judicial exemptions, can offer that protection. Second, 
this Comment argues that the typical solemnization ceremony by a religious 
official does violate the Establishment Clause, but remedying this violation 
does not require the removal of all solemnization licenses from religious 
officials. Instead, the implementation of narrow time, place, and manner 
restrictions that distinctly separate the civil and spiritual components of a 
religious wedding ceremony is all that is required. In coming to these 
conclusions, this Comment thus recognizes and navigates the peculiar tension 
presented between the two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.7 On the 
one hand, the Free Exercise Clause urges the protection of religious officials in 
the exercise of their licenses. On the other hand, the Establishment Clause 
urges that those licenses be taken away. 
In preserving the status quo of state licensing of religious officials to 
solemnize civil marriage, this Comment does not adopt a strict separation of 
church and state approach. A strict separationist approach in marriage argues 
that no religious officials should be licensed to marry couples whatsoever, 
leaving legal participation and authority over marriage exclusively in the hands 
of the state.8 Churches would be free to have their own ceremonies, governed 
according to their faiths, but their ceremonies would carry no legal relevance.9 
Strict separationists argue that this is either (1) constitutionally required by the 
 
 7 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (“These two Clauses . . . are frequently in 
tension.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS 189, 206 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
 9 This system would resemble that of Germany. In Germany, civil marriage may only be enacted by a 
civil registrar, and separate religious ceremonies have “no legal effect under German law.” See AFTER 
SECULAR LAW 316 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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Establishment Clause or (2) the simplest and most effective solution to our 
current debates over marriage.10 
Responding to the first argument, this Comment demonstrates that the 
Establishment Clause does not require the adoption of a strict separationist 
approach. Instead, this Comment shows that while the typical religious 
wedding ceremony does violate the Establishment Clause, narrow time, place, 
and manner restrictions on such ceremonies are all that is required to remedy 
the violation. These narrow restrictions would require two separate ceremonies 
at two different times and places, so as to distinctly separate the civil and 
religious aspects of marriage. 
More significantly, however, as to the second argument, a strict 
separationist approach does not adequately appreciate the interests of religious 
individuals and communities in having civil marriages solemnized by officials 
of their faith. Not only do many religious adherents believe that marriage 
encompasses both spiritual and civil responsibilities, but the solemnization of a 
religious couple’s wedding by an official of their faith has deep spiritual 
significance for the individuals being wed, the officiate, and the larger 
religious community. Thus, the wedding solemnization by a religious official 
represents both of these commitments and beliefs, spiritual and civic. To adopt 
a strict separationist approach is to do harm to this understanding of marriage 
for all three of these religious actors. Indeed, it is to harm the very exercise of 
their religion. 
For example, for the religious individuals being married, the opportunity to 
have their marriage solemnized by an official of their faith is not merely a 
matter of convenience; it is a spiritual recognition of the multifaceted and 
powerful commitments that come with their marital vows. For the religious 
official who marries them, it is not merely a matter of pride or power; it is the 
opportunity to make sacred even the civil responsibilities of marriage for his 
congregants and to impress upon them the weight of the institution. Likewise, 
for the larger religious community, it is not merely a matter of tradition; it is 
the commitment to an understanding of marriage and citizenship that helps to 
define and hold together that very community. A state should thus not trammel 
these interests, these acts of faith, absent a clear constitutional mandate, and no 
such mandate exists. 
 
 10 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 8, at 206. 
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This discussion of what marriage means to a particular religious 
community implicates a larger issue, one also tremendously relevant to this 
Comment (particularly in Part III concerning the Establishment Clause 
inquiry). That larger issue concerns the nature, or ontology, of marriage. 
Marriage is not merely a contractual agreement, created and ended by the state; 
for many it is also a sacred institution—a divine covenant or sacrament. 
Indeed, for many, the spiritual responsibilities and commitments of marriage 
subsume their temporal counterparts. The work of Joel Nichols and others 
bears witness to the importance of this spiritual aspect of marriage alongside 
its secular and temporal aspect.11 It therefore cannot be said that marriage is 
one or the other, temporal or spiritual, contract or covenant; it is by its nature 
an amalgamation of the two. This means that it cannot be decided once and for 
all whose understanding of marriage will govern. And as stated above, this 
Comment demonstrates that both understandings of marriage can coexist under 
the First Amendment without resorting to strict separation. 
To arrive at these conclusions, this Comment will proceed as follows: Part I 
begins by surveying the landscape of states’ current regulation of marriage and 
their regimes licensing religious officials to solemnize civil marriage. Part I 
also explores the historical role in marriage of religious officials on behalf of 
the state. This historical survey is crucial to the Establishment Clause inquiry, 
which often entails an analysis of whether a certain practice has been such a 
longstanding cultural or historical practice so as to become part of a larger 
civic custom of society.12 
Part II starts by summarizing the developments in state recognition of 
same-sex marriage and of antidiscrimination statutes based on sexual 
orientation, as well as state statutes designed to protect the free exercise rights 
of religious officials in solemnizing marriages. These statutory frameworks 
provide the basis for the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause tensions 
described above. Part II then explores whether licensed religious officials 
could seek an exemption through the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause 
from a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
the exercise of marriage solemnization licenses. This Comment argues that, as 
 
 11 See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE 
BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 5 (Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012); see also Fredric J. Bold, Jr., 
Comment, Vows to Collide: The Burgeoning Conflict Between Religious Institutions and Same-Sex Marriage 
Antidiscrimination Laws, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 180–96 (2009) (discussing the religious nature of marriage 
and the multifaceted nature of religious activity). 
 12 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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currently interpreted, the Free Exercise Clause provides no such protection. 
Such a law would likely be found to be a neutral law of general applicability, 
thus allowing no free exercise exemption to its requirements. 
Part III explores whether state statutory provisions licensing religious 
officials to solemnize civil marriages are an impermissible establishment of 
religion in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. As will be 
shown, the Establishment Clause prohibits certain delegations of government 
authority to religious officials.13 Specifically, it prohibits a fusion of religious 
and governmental functions.14 Though the state licensing statutes do not 
establish a religion, this Comment argues that the ubiquitous conflation of 
governmental and religious functions by a religious official at a typical 
wedding ceremony does violate the Establishment Clause’s prohibitions on 
impermissible delegations of governmental authority. 
Part IV examines the possible solutions to the First Amendment Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause problems presented in this Comment. 
Because the Free Exercise Clause does not protect a religious official’s right to 
discriminate against same-sex couples in the administration of his or her 
license, objecting religious officials must therefore rely on statutory or judicial 
exemptions from any laws prohibiting such discrimination, either at the state or 
federal level. Moreover, while some state religious freedom statutes provide 
piecemeal protection, this Comment argues that the best and most efficient 
source of statutory protection for abstaining religious officials should come 
from a federal statute. Such federal legislation should include protections for 
the conscience of licensed religious officials and from civil, criminal, and tax 
liability for their refusal to solemnize same-sex marriages. However, in the 
absence of statutory exemptions, this Comment argues that religious officials 
and communities should be able to avail themselves of judicially crafted 
exemptions in the form of the ministerial exception most recently articulated in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC15 and the 
expressive association doctrine in Boy Scouts of America. v. Dale.16 
Ultimately, these more corporate free exercise and associational rights provide 
licensed religious officials with the freedom to exercise their solemnization 
licenses according to their individual faiths. 
 
 13 See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982). 
 14 See id at 126. 
 15 132 S. Ct. 694, 714–15 (2012). 
 16 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
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Next, to remedy the establishment problem from Part III, Part IV proposes 
narrow time, place, and manner restrictions on the solemnization of marriages 
by licensed religious officials. These restrictions will focus on dividing more 
clearly the separate governmental and religious functions of marriage. By 
requiring two separate ceremonies, in two separate places, at two distinct 
times, and prohibiting spiritual language in the civil ceremony, these 
regulations will ensure that there is no longer a fusion of governmental and 
religious functions in the solemnization of marriages by licensed religious 
officials. This regime also accurately represents the dual nature of marriage, as 
both a civil and spiritual institution. Part IV ends by addressing the potential 
legal challenges to these regulations based upon the ironic burdens such 
regulations place on free exercise rights and their possible excessive 
government entanglement with religion. 
Finally, the Conclusion of this Comment explores the implications of its 
findings for legislatures, the law, and objecting religious communities. As the 
Conclusion will make clear, the First Amendment Religion Clauses make 
competing claims on the religious official licensed to solemnize civil marriage; 
though the Free Exercise Clause, as currently interpreted, does not provide 
religious officials with the protection to solemnize only those marriages that 
their faiths allow, other statutory and First Amendment exemptions do. At the 
same time, narrow time, place, and manner regulations are required to remedy 
the Establishment Clause violation caused by religious officials solemnizing 
civil marriage in such a way that creates a fusion of governmental and religious 
functions. 
I. LICENSING RELIGIOUS OFFICIALS TO SOLEMNIZE CIVIL MARRIAGE 
A. State Regulation of Marriage 
Marriage is regulated principally by state, not federal, law. This provides 
for remarkable diversity in laws regulating the requirements of a valid 
marriage and who may legally solemnize a civil marriage.17 However, every 
state extends a license, an authorization by law, to solemnize a wedding to only 
a specifically defined group of people.18 In several states, solemnizing a 
wedding without statutory authorization is a violation of the law and is subject 
 
 17 For a comprehensive survey of state statutes authorizing individuals to officiate weddings, see Robert 
E. Rains, Marriage in the Time of Internet Ministers: I Now Pronounce You Married, but Who Am I to Do So?, 
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 842–77 (2010). 
 18 See id. 
STEVENS GALLEYSPROOFS 4/3/2014  3:03 PM 
2014] BY THE POWER VESTED IN ME? 987 
to a penalty.19 Moreover, in almost every state, a solemnization ceremony is 
necessary for a valid marriage.20 Typically, states authorize religious officials 
and governmental officials, such as justices of the peace, to officiate marriage 
ceremonies.21 As mentioned above, these state licensing regimes form the basis 
for the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause issues discussed below. 
B. History of Religious Solemnization of Civil Marriage 
The role religious officials play in solemnizing civil marriage has been in 
place in America since its colonial beginnings.22 As early as 1694, religious 
officials were allowed to solemnize civil marriages alongside local 
magistrates.23 In Anglican colonies, the law expressly declared the children of 
marriages performed by religious officials outside the established church to be 
illegitimate.24 Thus, while initially a feature of state religious establishments,25 
since the American Revolution, states have allowed religious officials of all 
denominations to participate in the solemnization of civil marriage, including 
Catholics and Jews who have been denied other rights.26 
Religious solemnization of civil marriage continued uninterrupted after the 
disestablishment of religion by the states, and the practice was not raised in the 
debates surrounding the adoption of the individual state constitutions or the 
federal First Amendment Religion Clauses.27 Nor did the issue arise in debates 
over the meaning of the Establishment Clause in state or federal 
 
 19 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-22 (2013) (“All marriages attempted to be celebrated by [persons 
not found in the statute] are void.”); IOWA CODE § 595.11 (2014) (imposing a $50 penalty on marriages 
solemnized by individuals not authorized to do so in the statute). 
 20 See Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 735, 747, 
753 (2011) (“Except for the handful of jurisdictions that recognize common law marriages, all states require 
those seeking marriage to perform some type of procedure that is relatively uniform but often oddly 
burdensome.” (footnote omitted)); see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (2013) (requiring solemnization in 
the presence of a minister or magistrate); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 7 (2011) (“All marriages must be contracted 
by a formal ceremony performed or solemnized . . . .”). 
 21 See Rains, supra note 17, at 842–77. 
 22 MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 76 (1985). 
 23 Id.  
 24 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment at the Founding, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: 
AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 45, 53 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 
2012). 
 25 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1438–39 nn.157–58 (discussing the licensing of dissenting faiths in colonies with 
Anglican establishments). 
 26 See GROSSBERG, supra note 22, at 76. 
 27 See id.; infra note 29. 
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constitutions.28 The early Republic did see notable public controversies over 
the propriety of official proclamations establishing specific days for fasting, 
prayer, and thanksgiving, and whether or not the mail should run on Sundays.29 
Likewise, religious teachers and exercises in state public schools, in addition to 
state funding of religious private schools, raised similar objections.30 By 1833, 
every state in the Union had eliminated taxes tolled to support its clergy,31 and 
later nineteenth-century cases challenged the scope of government support for 
religious social services.32 But in the midst of all this controversy over the 
meaning and application of the disestablishment of religion, religious 
solemnization of civil marriage remained unchallenged.33  
The absence of any controversy over this issue in the past could mean that 
no public official thought of this role of the religious official as problematic 
under the Establishment Clause. Or this issue could have never crossed the 
minds of the Founders and the first generation thereafter. Whatever the reason, 
this history will prove important when the Establishment Clause question is 
taken up in Part III. 
II. CLERGY FREE EXERCISE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage 
At the time of publication, either through statute, judicial decision, or ballot 
initiative, seventeen states and the District of Columbia have recognized the 
rights of same-sex couples to marry.34 Corresponding with this recognition, 
many states (most of which have not recognized same-sex marriage) have 
amended their state civil rights acts to protect their citizens against 
 
 28 See GROSSBERG, supra note 22, at 76; infra note 29. 
 29 See Daniel L. Dreisbach, Defining and Testing the Prohibition on Religious Establishments in the 
Early Republic, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 24, at 252, 261–66. 
 30 See Steven K. Green, The “Second Disestablishment”: The Evolution of Nineteenth-Century 
Understandings of Separation of Church and State, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 24, at 
280, 294–99. 
 31 See Thomas C. Berg, Disestablishment from Blaine to Everson: Federalism, School Wars, and the 
Emerging Modern State, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 24, at 307, 311. 
 32 See id. at 315–32. 
 33 See supra notes 27–32. 
 34 FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated Dec. 20, 2013); see, e.g., 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (recognizing same-sex marriage through statute); Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (adopting same-sex marriage via judicial decision). 
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discrimination in employment and in public accommodations on the basis of 
sexual orientation.35 
Recognizing the tension between a citizen’s right to be free from 
discrimination and the authority of religious officials to solemnize civil 
marriage, most states that have recognized same-sex marriage have enacted 
legislative protections for religious officials who would refuse to marry a 
same-sex couple.36 Depending on the state, these statutes include a 
combination of the following protections: no religious official shall be 
compelled to solemnize any marriage against his or her conscience; a refusal 
will not affect a church’s property tax exempt status; and no refusal will create 
any civil liability on the part of the religious official or the corporate body.37 
Two states that have recognized same-sex marriage, Iowa and Massachusetts, 
however, do not have these statutory exemptions.38 Could one of these states—
or future states that adopt comparable regimes—require its religious officials 
not to discriminate against same-sex couples in the administration of their 
licenses to solemnize civil marriage? 
The rest of Part II will confront the situation in which a state that 
recognizes same-sex marriage has passed legislation requiring all those given 
the legal authority to solemnize civil marriage to solemnize the marriages of all 
couples who seek their services, straight or gay, who otherwise are eligible to 
marry. Failure to administer the license in this way, the legislation says, will 
result in a forfeiture of the license so extended. In other words, religious 
officials may no longer discriminate against same-sex couples in their 
solemnization of civil marriage. Perhaps unexpectedly, such legislation would 
not violate the First Amendment free exercise rights of the religious official 
who would choose not to solemnize same-sex marriages due to his or her faith. 
 
 35 See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the 
Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1190 nn.66–67 (2012) (surveying 
the twenty-one states’ and the District of Columbia’s sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws).  
 36 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 274, 283–84 nn.44–48 (2010) (summarizing state laws protecting the conscience of religious 
officials in light of same-sex marriage); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: 
Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 1417, 1509–11 (2012).  
 37 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11, 1-a (McKinney Supp. 2014); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 400(a) 
(West Supp. 2014). 
 38 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 38 (2012); see also IOWA CODE § 595.10 (2014). 
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B. No Free Exercise Exemption for Licensed Religious Officials 
Current free exercise laws are controlled by the 1990 Supreme Court case 
Employment Division v. Smith.39 In that case, the Court held that neutral laws 
of general applicability are constitutionally permissible under the First 
Amendment Free Exercise Clause even if they burden a private party’s 
religion.40 Thus, if a law that required all individuals licensed to solemnize 
civil marriage to do so in a nondiscriminatory manner were found to be a 
neutral law of general applicability, then a licensed religious official would 
have no free exercise exemption.41 Conversely, if the law were found to be not 
neutral or not generally applicable, it would be subject to strict scrutiny and 
required to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.42 
Courts, however, have had difficulty articulating precisely what makes a 
law neutral and of general applicability.43 For example, in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court found that though a 
statute prohibiting animal sacrifice on its face appeared neutral, it was used to 
single out only certain forms of religious animal sacrifice when applied.44 The 
Court thus struck the ordinance down as unconstitutional.45 In contrast, in 
Locke v. Davey, the Court determined that the State of Washington’s statutory 
prohibition of the use of state scholarship funding for students seeking a 
theology degree was not unconstitutional.46 Though Justice Scalia (the author 
of the Smith opinion) dissented, arguing that this statute was unconstitutional 
since it facially discriminated against religion,47 the majority reasoned that the 
burden placed on religion was “far milder” than that in Lukumi because it 
imposed neither a civil nor criminal sanction on the practice of religion.48 As a 
result of these inconsistent rulings by the Supreme Court, lower courts have 
had difficulty applying the Smith standard.49 Nevertheless, a statute prohibiting 
discrimination against same-sex couples by those licensed to solemnize 
 
 39 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 40 See id. at 879. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). 
 43 See Erin N. East, Comment, I Object: The RLUIPA as a Model for Protecting the Conscience Rights of 
Religious Objectors to Same-Sex Relationships, 59 EMORY L.J. 259, 280–83 (2009) (discussing the problems 
faced by courts in applying the Smith standard).  
 44 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 538–39. 
 45 See id. at 524. 
 46 See 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004). 
 47 See id. at 726 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
 48 See id. at 720 (majority opinion). 
 49 See East, supra note 43, at 282–83. 
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marriages makes no facial reference to religion and, so long as it applies to all 
actors covered, appears to be a neutral law of general applicability. 
There is a question, however, as to whether the religious neutrality of a law 
is determined only by its final words or also by the intent of the legislature or 
the actions of governmental officials in implementing the law. The Supreme 
Court has not addressed this issue, but in Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, a federal 
district court enjoined the State of Washington’s “duty to fill” statute on behalf 
of pharmacists who raised religious objections to filling prescriptions for 
contraceptives.50 The court enjoined the statute based on evidence that 
“strongly suggest[ed] that the overriding objective of the subject regulations 
was . . . to eliminate moral and religious objections from the business of 
dispensing medication.”51 Thus, the statute, despite its neutral wording, was 
not a neutral law of general applicability and was subject to strict scrutiny, 
which it did not pass.52 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, 
however, ruling that it was improper to look to the statute’s legislative history 
and intent to establish whether the law was neutral and of general 
applicability.53 Additionally, to the extent that the Washington State Board of 
Pharmacy’s motivation for adopting the rule could have been discerned, the 
Ninth Circuit wrote, “it indicates that the Board’s concern was to promote the 
public welfare, not to burden religious belief.”54 Under a rule as such, almost 
any carefully crafted and facially neutral legislation would pass muster under 
the Smith test and be found neutral and of general applicability. This is 
especially true if the authors of the legislation utter nothing as evidence to the 
contrary. 
This no-intent approach is similar to the one the Supreme Court endorsed 
in Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law v. Martinez.55 In Martinez, a religious student group on a 
public California law school campus challenged a policy requiring official 
student groups to comply with the school’s nondiscrimination policy.56 
Specifically, all recognized student groups on campus were required to accept 
 
 50 See 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2007), vacated, 586 F.3d. 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 51 Id. at 1259. 
 52 Id. at 1259–60, 1263. 
 53 See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 54 Id. at 1134. 
 55 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 56 See id. at 2974. 
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all comers—that is, not to discriminate on the basis of, among other things, 
religion and sexual orientation.57 The Christian Legal Society was denied 
official student group status because its by-laws required the exclusion of 
students who did not sign and comply with a statement of faith that contained 
prohibitions on “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”58 In denying the Christian 
Legal Society’s claim that the law school had violated its First Amendment 
right to free exercise, the Court did not look beyond the face of the statute in 
question in deciding its constitutionality.59 
In dissent, Justice Alito argued that use of the nondiscrimination policy was 
intended to burden religious organizations like the Christian Legal Society.60 
The law school, Alito wrote, “currently has more than 60 registered groups 
and, in all its history, has denied registration to exactly one: the Christian Legal 
Society.”61 
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has previously 
inquired into the intent of a statute when addressing First Amendment case 
law. For example, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, a Kentucky 
courtroom expanded its original Ten Commandments display to include other 
nonreligious items throughout the course of its Establishment Clause 
litigation.62 In striking down the display, the Court gave great weight to what it 
discerned to be intent to disguise its original Establishment Clause violation.63 
The Court also looked to the intent of Congress in passing the Religious 
Lands Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in order to uphold the act from an 
Establishment Clause challenge.64 Even more explicitly, in Board of Education 
v. Mergens, the Court considered the phrase “noncurriculum related” in the 
Equal Access Act of 1984 in light of its “broad legislative purpose” to “address 
perceived widespread discrimination against religious speech in public 
schools.”65 
Despite these precedents, the law remains uncertain regarding whether an 
intent-based inquiry could be used to strike down a law requiring religious 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59 See id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 60 See id. at 3000. 
 61 Id.  
 62 See 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005). 
 63 See id. at 863–66. 
 64 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–17 (2005). 
 65 496 U.S. 226, 238–39 (1990) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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officials to not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in solemnizing 
civil marriages. Martinez was the most recent of these cases to be decided and 
is very similar in nature to the hypothetical at issue here. Moreover, the intent 
of a statute barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is likely to 
be found to be just that: the protection of same-sex couples from 
discrimination. 
The Smith test therefore provides little protection for religious objectors 
disobeying antidiscrimination laws designed to protect same-sex couples.66 For 
example, in North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego 
County Superior Court, a lesbian woman seeking intrauterine insemination to 
become pregnant filed suit under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act against 
two doctors who refused to administer the treatment to her on the basis of their 
religious objection to her sexual orientation.67 The California Supreme Court 
held that the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which protects same-sex couples from 
discrimination, was a neutral law of general applicability.68 Thus, the doctors 
could not violate this statute by claiming a First Amendment free exercise 
exemption.69 If this case is any indication, any inquiry into the intent of a law 
prohibiting discrimination against same-sex couples in the solemnization of 
civil marriage is unlikely to change the analysis of these laws as neutral and of 
general applicability. 
However, should a court find that the law is not neutral or of general 
applicability, a litigant must then demonstrate that the law cannot survive strict 
scrutiny—that the law serves no compelling governmental interest or that it is 
not narrowly tailored.70 The law could also be subject to strict scrutiny if it 
were enacted in a state that had its own state version of the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act71 or a state constitutional provision that provides 
greater protection for religious liberty than the federal Free Exercise Clause.72 
Nevertheless, a state’s interest in protecting its citizens from discrimination is a 
 
 66 See East, supra note 43, at 286–87. 
 67 See 189 P.3d 959, 964 (Cal. 2008). 
 68 Id. at 966; accord Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 68, 309 P.3d 53 (holding 
that the New Mexico Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination against customers on the basis of 
sexual orientation, is a neutral law of general applicability). 
 69 See N. Coast Women’s Care, 189 P.3d at 966–67. 
 70 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). 
 71 See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 
466 (2010); Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Provides a Defense in Suits by 
Private Plaintiffs, 99 Va. L. Rev. 343 (2013). 
 72 See, e.g., W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 2:63 
(2012) (analyzing the states that retain a strict scrutiny requirement post-Smith). 
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compelling governmental interest.73 Therefore, the argument would come to 
rest on whether the law is narrowly tailored. The question then becomes 
whether it is necessary to curtail the conscience rights of a small group of 
religious individuals when there are many other licensed individuals, religious 
and nonreligious, who would be willing to solemnize the marriages of same-
sex couples. 
On this point, several commentators argue that to protect same-sex couples 
while simultaneously accommodating religious objectors, the law should 
evaluate the burdens imposed by such an objection.74 If the burden imposed 
upon a same-sex couple by a religious objector is too great, they argue, then 
the same-sex couple’s need would trump the religious official’s objection, thus 
stripping him of his protection.75 This would likely occur in circumstances 
where there is only one church within a large geographic area with no justice 
of the peace to substitute. While these instances might be rare, they are more 
likely to occur in less populous areas or, ironically, in communities with 
smaller gay or lesbian populations.76 In more populous areas, where gay and 
lesbian couples could likely readily find able and willing substitute officiates, 
an analysis of the relative burdens would therefore likely protect the religious 
objector.77 
Additionally, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Supreme Court 
struck down an ordinance forbidding certain religious animal sacrifices in part 
because the ordinances “proscribe[d] more religious conduct than [was] 
necessary to achieve their stated ends.”78 Thus, because same-sex couples 
could always avail themselves of the self-help measure of seeking a 
nonobjecting licensed official to solemnize their marriages,79 a marriage 
 
 73 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (“[T]he Government has a 
fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . .”). 
 74 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 8, at 198; see also ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON 
GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 150 (2010). 
 75 See Laycock, supra note 8, at 197–98.  
 76 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the 
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 8, 
at 77, 97–100. This analysis assumes (problematically) that the burden imposed on a morally objecting 
religious official is not different in kind from the burden imposed on same-sex couples.  
 77 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1330–33 (2007) 
(discussing the “proportionality” element of the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny). 
 78 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993). 
 79 Cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004) (finding the Child Online Protection Act to not be the 
least restrictive means and thus unconstitutional because of the existence of private filtering software); United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 807 (2000) (striking down a similar law for similar 
reasons); Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional 
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antidiscrimination law would likewise proscribe more religious conduct than 
necessary to achieve its ends.80 For these reasons, should the law be found to 
be nonneutral or nongenerally applicable, it would likely not survive strict 
scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, a law requiring all individuals to administer their marriage 
licenses in a nondiscriminatory fashion would most likely be found neutral and 
of general applicability. Therefore, a state, consistent with the Free Exercise 
Clause as currently interpreted, could require its licensed religious officials to 
administer their licenses in a nondiscriminatory fashion to other-sex and same-
sex parties. 
This point is not without controversy. Many authors dismiss such a claim 
outright.81 Distinguished law and religion scholars Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle 
also argue that this conclusion is incorrect.82 While they acknowledge that a 
government could, by “impos[ing] a condition on its grant of the authority to 
solemnize marriages,” create such a law “in a constitutionally defensible 
way,”83 Lupu and Tuttle go on to say that “[t]he idea that clergy are agents of 
the state, authorized to solemnize civil marriage, and therefore subject to 
considerable state control, is deeply inconsistent with a core aspect of religious 
liberty.”84 Specifically, Lupu and Tuttle argue that cases such as McDaniel v. 
Paty,85 Locke v. Davey, and Hosanna-Tabor86 stand for the proposition that 
“full religious liberty cannot co-exist with state control over the clergy.”87 
 
Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 762 (2003) (discussing the impact of the availability of private self-help 
measures on whether laws are narrowly tailored). 
 80 The goal of such a statute could not be to end all forms of private discrimination against same-sex 
couples. See infra note 123 (discussing the state action doctrine). Thus, because a licensed religious official is 
not a state actor (see Part III), the religious official’s conduct would either fall outside the scope of the statute’s 
stated ends entirely or, at minimum, be proscribed more than necessary due to available self-help measures, as 
discussed above. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict 
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2423 (1996) (“If the law doesn’t actually advance the interest, then not 
having the law at all would be a less restrictive but equally effective alternative.”). 
 81 See, e.g., Eric Alan Isaacson, Are Same-Sex Marriages Really a Threat to Religious Liberty?, 8 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 123, 152 (2012) (“A state cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, require . . . priests to 
solemnize . . . marriages at odds with their own traditions.”); Bold, Jr., supra note 11, at 199; cf. Roger 
Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
939, 977 (2007) (discussing the potential issues surrounding the licensing of religious officials to solemnize 
civil marriage). 
 82 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at 283. 
 83 Id. at 282.  
 84 Id. at 284.  
 85 See infra Part III. 
 86 See infra Part IV. 
 87 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at 284. 
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Moreover, they argue, “the First Amendment diffuses and separates powers, 
remitting the question of who may be entitled to religious marriage entirely to 
the judgment of clergy and the faith communities they represent.”88 “State 
interference with these forms of selectivity,” they conclude, “cannot possibly 
be consistent with the free exercise of religion.”89 
Lupu and Tuttle may ultimately be correct. But their analysis neglects the 
reality of Smith. As demonstrated above, the Free Exercise Clause, as 
interpreted in Smith, allows a state to burden the religious liberty of its citizens 
with neutral laws of general applicability.90 Lupu and Tuttle appear instead to 
be arguing for an exception to Smith based on more corporate free exercise and 
associational rights, found outside the Free Exercise Clause.91 These larger, 
corporate free exercise rights will thus play a crucial role in the solution 
section of this Comment and are addressed in Part IV. 
Because a law requiring all individuals to administer their licenses to marry 
in a nondiscriminatory fashion would likely be found to be neutral and of 
general applicability, the Free Exercise Clause provides no exemption for 
religious objectors to the law. As a result, protections for religious objectors 
must come from outside the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. These 
protections include not only state and federal statutory exemptions, but 
judicially crafted exemptions, such as the ministerial exception92 and the 
expressive association doctrine.93 These protections are explored in Part IV of 
this Comment.94 
But perhaps the more complex and troublesome First Amendment issue 
relating to licensing religious officials is whether these regimes have created an 
impermissible establishment of religion. How can we abide religious officials 
being able to withhold legal rights from other citizens? Is this not the law 
operating according to a certain faith? To answer these questions, this 
Comment addresses in Part III this Establishment Clause question before 
 
 88 Id. at 285 (citing Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental 
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998)). 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 91 The authors point to another means of protecting the free exercise rights of licensed religious officials, 
namely the expressive association doctrine, which is discussed in Part IV. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at 
285–86.  
 92 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 714–15 (2012). 
 93 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 
 94 The issue of whether a targeted statutory exemption for religion constitutes an establishment of 
religion will also be addressed in Part IV.  
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turning to solutions to both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause issues 
in Part IV. 
III.  AN IMPERMISSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION 
As intimated above, there appears to be a First Amendment Establishment 
Clause problem in allowing marital status and attendant rights to be meted out 
by religious officials according to their personal religious beliefs. Why are 
religious officials able to wield this civil power and withhold it from some 
citizens according to their private faiths? Before diving into whether this 
practice violates the Establishment Clause, it will be useful to begin with a 
brief survey of what the Establishment Clause prohibits and how its 
interpretation has changed over time. After this brief survey, Part III addresses 
two theories of how the practice of licensing religious officials to solemnize 
civil marriage may be considered an establishment of religion—one based on 
the state action doctrine and another on an impermissible delegation of 
governmental authority. Part III concludes with a discussion of perhaps the 
strongest argument against religious solemnization of civil marriage as an 
establishment of religion—that of the historical practice exemption to a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 
A. The Establishment Clause: A Brief Survey 
Throughout its history of interpreting the Establishment Clause, the 
Supreme Court has developed several unique and contrasting approaches.95 
First, there is the “separationist” approach. This approach emphasizes the need 
to protect government and religious affairs from unduly influencing or relying 
on one another for support, adherence, or financial stability.96 First appearing 
in the 1947 decision, Everson v. Board of Education,97 which incorporated the 
Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,98 
this separationist line of cases has been used most ardently in cases forbidding 
the use of religious officials, ceremonies, and symbols in public schools,99 and 
those preventing taxpayer support of religious organizations.100 
 
 95 See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT 173 (3d ed. 2011).  
 96 See id. at 174. 
 97 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 98 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 175. 
 99 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).  
 100 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970). 
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In contrast, an “accommodationist” approach emerged before Everson in a 
1952 case upholding the constitutionality of time-release programs for 
religious students of public schools to attend religious services.101 “[W]e find 
no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be 
hostile to religion,” Justice Douglas wrote.102 Accommodation logic thus 
argues for equal treatment of religion as opposed to complete ostracism from 
government affairs.103 Most prominently until the 1970s, this 
accommodationist line of cases allowed for numerous avenues of government 
support for private religious schools.104 
However, beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court sought to find a new 
middle-ground analysis in the form of a “neutrality” approach to the 
Establishment Clause.105 A three-prong test thus emerged in 1971 in the case 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman to strike down a state policy of reimbursing religious 
schools for some of the costs of teaching required secular courses.106 For a 
challenged law to be constitutional under this new Lemon test, the law must (1) 
have a secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion, and (3) not “foster an excessive . . . entanglement” between 
church and state.107 Yet the Lemon test remains inconsistently applied, if at 
all.108 
In the wake of this inconsistency, numerous other approaches to the 
Establishment Clause have emerged. Tests such as “endorsement,” “coercion,” 
“equal treatment,” or “strict neutrality” have each been favored by a particular 
Justice or Court at one time or another.109 Similarly, the Court has at times 
used a wild card “history” or “tradition” approach to Establishment Clause 
cases.110 This wild card historical test, as mentioned above, is evaluated below 
in section D. 
Clearly, these Establishment Clause cases are often in tension with one 
another. And though the Establishment Clause prohibits such practices as 
 
 101 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952). 
 102 Id. at 314. 
 103 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 177. 
 104 See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766–67 (1976). 
 105 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 177. 
 106 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
 107 Id. at 612–13 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 108 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 180. 
 109 See id. at 180–86. 
 110 See id. at 185–86. 
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mandatory morning Bible readings in public school,111 prayers offered at 
middle school graduations112 or at football games,113 public displays of 
religious symbols in county courthouses,114 and education policies that 
overwhelmingly benefit private religious schools,115 it is not immediately clear 
how the Establishment Clause ought to apply to the religious official licensed 
to solemnize civil marriage. 
For example, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the Supreme Court held that the 
Establishment Clause did not forbid a legislature from allowing religious 
groups the right to only hire members of their own faith, for religious or 
secular jobs.116 In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, the Court upheld the right of a 
religious education licensee to engage in religious discrimination.117 Thus, 
when a religious organization is operating within its own affairs, it can 
sometimes discriminate on at least religious grounds. However, as cases like 
Hosanna-Tabor and Martinez make clear, what looks like discrimination on 
religious grounds to a religious organization may look like disability or sexual 
orientation discrimination to others.118 
In contrast to cases featuring religious groups operating within their own 
affairs, religious groups are not permitted to discriminate on religious grounds 
when they are operating with state funding or performing governmental 
functions.119 Thus, faith-based initiatives that receive government money may 
not discriminate on religious grounds against recipients of that money.120 
Likewise, a state may not delegate its governmental functions to be carried out 
by a religious organization.121 For example, in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, the 
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a state law that allowed 
 
 111 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
 112 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
 113 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000). 
 114 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989). 
 115 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
 116 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 339 (1987). 
 117 See infra Part IV. 
 118 See supra notes 55, 92. 
 119 See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298–
99 (1899). 
 120 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 798 (2000) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 
(1997)) (inquiring as to whether a program “defines its recipients by reference to religion”).  
 121 See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127. 
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churches to veto applications for liquor licenses.122 Other laws concerning the 
inspection of food and the police protection of private universities have also 
been struck down under this rule.123 
Deciding whether the practice of religious officials solemnizing civil 
marriage is an impermissible establishment of religion thus requires one to 
answer questions concerning the extent to which a licensed religious official is 
a private or state actor, and whether states have improperly delegated their 
governmental functions to private religious officials. These questions are 
addressed in the sections below. 
Section B argues that because licensed religious officials are not state 
actors, they do not violate the Establishment Clause when they discriminate in 
the solemnization of civil marriages on the basis of religion. Section B also 
argues that the extension of a license to solemnize civil marriage by the state 
does not constitute such a substantial benefit to religious officials so as to 
justify the prohibition of religious discrimination in its administration. 
However, section C argues that states have violated the Establishment Clause 
by impermissibly delegating their governmental functions to private religious 
officials so as to create an impermissible “fusion” of governmental and 
religious functions. Section D then argues that this Establishment Clause 
violation is unlikely to fall within the historical or cultural practice exemption 
to the Establishment Clause introduced above. 
B. A Licensed Religious Official Is Not a State Actor 
A licensed religious official would be bound by the Constitution and the 
Establishment Clause only if that official were also a state actor.124 Although 
the state action doctrine is at times unclear and incoherent,125 the religious 
 
 122 See id. 
 123 See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (striking 
down a portion of New York’s kosher fraud laws); State v. Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274, 278 (N.C. 1994) 
(finding that “the State of North Carolina delegated its police power to [a private religious institution]” in 
violation of the Establishment Clause). 
 124 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights 
Cases, the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That 
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 125 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1985). 
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official licensed to solemnize civil marriage is certainly not a state actor.126 As 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis makes clear, the mere licensure of an individual 
or an organization does not make that private individual or organization a state 
actor.127 Thus, it is no violation of the Establishment Clause for such a licensed 
religious official to discriminate in the administration of his or her license 
according to the dictates of his or her faith. 
This stands in some tension with cases that inquire into the existence of 
religious discrimination practiced by faith-based nonprofits that receive 
government funding or other benefits,128 and also with cases that examine 
whether a private actor performs a function that is “traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the State.”129 Nevertheless, these tensions can be reconciled. 
To begin, as discussed above, marriage is not an exclusive prerogative of 
the state.130 Because marriage is not the exclusive prerogative of the state, the 
licensed religious official is not converted into a state actor. 
Yet an argument could be made that because religious officials who 
solemnize civil marriage receive customary payments from the couples that 
receive their services, these payments are a form of government funding, and 
therefore religious officials should not be permitted to discriminate on 
religious grounds in the exercise of their governmentally funded activity. Such 
customary payments to the religious officiate, however, are virtually identical 
to the system of private vouchers redeemed at religious schools upheld in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.131 In Zelman, a group of Ohio taxpayers brought 
an Establishment Clause challenge against an Ohio program of tuition 
assistance that led to 96% of those receiving the assistance enrolling in 
religious schools.132 Despite this statistic, the Supreme Court upheld the 
program, finding that it was a neutral program of “true private choice.”133 The 
 
 126 See Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 8, at 1, 20. 
 127 See 407 U.S. 163, 176–77 (1972) (holding that a private club did not become a state actor as a result of 
its license to serve alcohol).  
 128 See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 757–58 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971). 
 129 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (italics removed) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991, 1011 (1982)). 
 130 See Bold, supra note 11, at 185. 
 131 See 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). 
 132 Id. at 658. 
 133 Id. at 662. 
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Court thus affirmed a line of cases that found such neutral programs of private 
choice immune from an Establishment Clause challenge.134 
Virtually the same system is at play here, where the licensed religious 
official is compensated for his or her services as wedding officiate. Because 
such state licensing statutes are neutral with regard to religion,135 any payments 
to a solemnizing religious officiate is the result of true private choice. 
Consequently, such customary payments to the licensed religious official do 
not constitute government funding, nor do they change the Establishment 
Clause analysis. 
Furthermore, religious discrimination by a religious entity only becomes 
problematic when a certain threshold benefit is extended. The licensing of 
religious officials to solemnize civil marriage does not cross this benefit 
threshold. This can be seen best by juxtaposing various decisions forbidding or 
allowing religious discrimination by religious entities depending on the 
individual context. For instance, government aid to religious social services or 
schools clearly triggers an inquiry into the existence of religious discrimination 
on the part of the religious recipient.136 Likewise, a religious group seeking 
recognition and access to school resources on a public law-school campus was 
not permitted to discriminate on religious grounds.137 Yet, as noted above in 
Presiding Bishop v. Amos138 and Hosanna-Tabor,139 schools and churches have 
been permitted to engage in religious discrimination despite the benefits of 
incorporation and teaching licenses extended by the state.140 
Thus, the benefit of a license to solemnize civil marriage does not cross this 
“benefit threshold” because such a license is more akin to the legal ability to 
incorporate or teach than it is to the benefit of government tax dollars or 
private university resources. For example, the legal recognition given to a 
religiously solemnized marriage ceremony is like the legal recognition given to 
the preexisting constitutional rights of religious entities to organize, 
 
 134 Id. at 662–63. 
 135 See supra Part I. 
 136 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 797–98 (2000) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 
234 (1997)) (inquiring as to whether a program “defines its recipients by reference to religion”). 
 137 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971, 2994–95 (2010). 
 138 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 330 (1987). 
 139 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706–09 (2012). 
 140 See, e.g., DURHAM & SMITH, supra note 72, § 4:1 (detailing the need for religious organizations to 
incorporate). 
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incorporate, and educate their children.141 The issue is not whether religious 
groups have a constitutional right to give legal effect to their marriage 
ceremonies, but that the legal recognition of those ceremonies does not further 
augment the abilities of those communities to have private wedding 
ceremonies, which they are already capable of doing under the First 
Amendment.142 Government aid or school resources, in contrast, enable 
religious organizations to operate in ways that they otherwise would not be 
able. Furthermore, unlike government aid, which raises the possibility of 
coerced support of religious practices,143 a religious official licensed to 
solemnize civil marriage coerces no one in solemnizing the marriages of only 
those couples that choose that official. Therefore, because the religious official 
and community gain no benefit other than mere legal recognition, a license to 
solemnize civil marriage does not constitute such a substantial benefit so as to 
warrant a prohibition on its religiously discriminatory application. 
C. An Impermissible Delegation of Governmental Authority 
Even if a licensed religious official is not a state actor, or a license does not 
constitute such a substantial benefit so as to justify a prohibition on religious 
discrimination, another wholly distinct Establishment Clause issue may be 
asserted against the licensed religious official; this theory may be called the 
“Impermissible Delegation Doctrine.” Specifically, as mentioned above, the 
Establishment Clause has been read to forbid certain delegations of civil 
authority and discretion to religious institutions.144 
For example, in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, a Massachusetts law allowing 
churches to veto applications for a liquor license within five hundred feet of 
church property was found to be an impermissible establishment of religion.145 
 
 141 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognizing the rights of parents to send 
their children to religious private schools). 
 142 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (recognizing the limits of government 
interference with internal church doctrine and practices).  
 143 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“No tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions . . . .”). 
 144 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) (Blackmun, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., concurring) 
(“We have believed that . . . a government cannot endure when there is fusion between religion and the 
political regime.”); see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 709–10 
(1994) (striking down a school district created along religious lines); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 
116, 127 (1982); Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (striking 
down a portion of New York’s kosher fraud laws); State v. Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274, 278 (N.C. 1994); State 
ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Life Servs., Inc., 2000 ND 166, ¶ 36, 616 N.W.2d 826, 839. 
 145 See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127. 
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In striking down the law, the Supreme Court found that the law “enmeshe[d] 
churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers contrary to . . . the 
Establishment Clause.”146 Additionally, the Court was concerned that the 
statute could provide “a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of 
some by reason of the power conferred.”147 Moreover, “the core rationale 
underlying the Establishment Clause,” the Court wrote, “is preventing ‘a 
fusion of governmental and religious functions.’”148 According to the Court, 
the Framers thus did not intend a “government in which important, 
discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with 
religious institutions.”149 
Is the authority to marry similar to the authority to veto applications for a 
liquor license? Arguably, the burdens imposed by a denial of marital status, 
with its denial of marital benefits and stigma of discrimination, is more of a 
burden than the business lost from a denied liquor license. But perhaps these 
cases are distinguishable: churches in Larkin held absolute veto power;150 in 
contrast, objecting religious officials are the exception to the rule—they hold 
no veto power. Also, Larkin entailed the delegation of pure governmental 
power151: the discretion to make zoning decisions. Marriage, on the other hand, 
is not a pure and unequivocal government power. Is this distinction enough to 
avoid the dictum in Larkin? 
As noted above, other cases have used this “fusion” rationale to strike 
down laws concerning the regulation of fraudulent Kosher food,152 the creation 
of a school district along religious lines,153 a court order allowing a corporation 
and its ministerial association to select a new board of directors,154 and a 
religious university’s use of state police power.155 Perhaps most notably, 
however, this prohibition on fusions of governmental and religious functions 
 
 146 Id. at 126. 
 147 Id. at 125–26. 
 148 Id. at 126–27 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)). 
 149 Id. at 127. 
 150 Id. (stating that the law at issue gave the church “unilateral and absolute power”). 
 151 Id. at 122 (“This is a power ordinarily vested in agencies of government.”).  
 152 See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 153 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696–97 (1994). 
 154 See State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Life Servs., Inc., 2000 ND 166, 616 N.W.2d 826. 
 155 See State v. Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274 (N.C. 1994). 
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was used in Lee v. Weisman to help strike down a public school’s practice of 
offering nonsectarian prayers at graduation ceremonies.156 
Larkin and its progeny thus invite an examination of when and where a 
“fusion of governmental and religious functions” occurs. To be sure, marriage 
entails both governmental and religious functions. For example, on the one 
hand, the Massachusetts and Iowa Supreme Courts describe their decisions 
recognizing same-sex marriage as relating only to “civil marriage”—marriage 
created and maintained by the state.157 On the other hand, those faiths apt to 
object to solemnizing same-sex marriages believe marriage is a covenant 
before God and man, or a sacrament symbolizing God’s relationship with 
man.158 
Are these two functions “fused” when a religious official solemnizes the 
marriage of two individuals in his or her congregation? Arguably yes—that is, 
if the religious official purports to be enacting civil and religious authority with 
the same breath at the pronouncement of marriage. This seems to be what 
religious officials in fact do when they proclaim, at the culmination of their 
religious ceremony, “By the power vested in me by the state of X, I now 
pronounce you husband and wife.” And what is a fusion of governmental and 
religious functions if not a single proclamation by one individual that 
accomplishes both civil and spiritual marriage? 
As this analysis makes clear, even though marriage is not an unequivocal 
sole governmental power, like the authority to make zoning decisions, what 
authority the state does have over marriage is fused with the authority of a 
religious community in the same ceremony. This fusion thus violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
This, however, does not end the establishment inquiry. As mentioned 
previously, in a long line of establishment cases, the Supreme Court has held 
that certain longstanding and culturally significant religious displays in public 
do not violate the Establishment Clause. In the next section, however, this 
 
 156 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) (Blackmun, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., concurring) 
(“We have believed that . . . a government cannot endure when there is fusion between religion and the 
political regime.”). 
 157 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (“We begin by considering 
the nature of civil marriage itself. Simply put, the government creates civil marriage.”); see also Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (stating that “civil marriage will now take on a new meaning”).  
 158 See, e.g., John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, More Than a Mere Contract: Marriage as a Contract and 
Covenant in Law and Theology, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 595, 606–11 (2008). 
STEVENS GALLEYSPROOFS 4/3/2014  3:03 PM 
1006 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:979 
Comment argues that this historical practice exception cannot be relied on to 
pardon this otherwise impermissible fusion of governmental and religious 
functions. 
D. The Historical Practice Inquiry 
The Supreme Court has held that certain cultural and historical practices of 
state and federal government entities that appear to contain religious elements 
do not violate the Establishment Clause.159 For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 
the Supreme Court upheld a Rhode Island government display of a manger 
scene while observing that “[t]here is an unbroken history of official 
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in 
American life.”160 The Court found that the manger scene took on a secular 
civic purpose having become a part of the fabric of society.161 Similarly, in 
upholding a state practice of funding a chaplain to open its legislative sessions 
in prayer, the Court wrote, “In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history 
of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.”162 
Moreover, in upholding a public display of the Decalogue, the Court wrote that 
the Decalogue had become part of “America’s heritage.”163 These precedents 
therefore provide a possible Establishment Clause escape route for the 
otherwise impermissible fusion of governmental and religious functions 
discussed above. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in this area has charted a jagged and 
uncertain course in deciding what government displays of religion are 
permissible.164 Contributing to this uncertainty is the fact-intensive and 
context-specific nature of the inquiry.165 That being said, several rules of 
thumb can be gleaned from Court precedent to help determine whether the 
solemnization of marriages by religious officials is an establishment of 
religion.166 
 
 159 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 160 Id. at 674. 
 161 See id. at 680–86. 
 162 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
 163 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 689 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
 164 See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding 
that a similar manger scene was a violation of the Establishment Clause).  
 165 See id. at 621 n.70. 
 166 These four rules of thumb are borrowed from WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 234–36. 
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First, older displays and practices are more likely to be permissible displays 
of religion than newer displays and practices.167 This principle when applied to 
the solemnization of marriages by religious officials seems to overwhelmingly 
weigh against a finding of an establishment of religion. As discussed in Part I, 
religious officials have been solemnizing marriages since the colonial period. 
The first colony began licensing clergy to solemnize weddings in 1694.168 
Moreover, the ubiquitous role of religious officials in marriage ceremonies 
today seems to fit perfectly within the scope of those practices that have 
become part of the civic fabric of society.169 
But perhaps this timeframe that encompasses the colonial period proves too 
much. Norms, societal attitudes, and the law itself have changed drastically in 
recent times on the subject of marriage.170 How then can what was 
commonplace in colonial times continue to justify the status quo concerning 
marriage today? Nevertheless, the longstanding historical practice of religious 
solemnization of civil marriage may be the strongest argument against a 
finding of an establishment of religion. 
Second, the characterization of the establishment symbol or practice in 
question is crucial.171 This inquiry clearly weighs in favor of a finding of 
establishment. The question here is how one characterizes the traditional 
wedding ceremony solemnized by a religious official. Given the presence of 
the religious official, the (typical) church venue, the recitation of prayers, and 
the exchanging of vows, there seems no other conclusion than that it is a 
religious ceremony. A court could strain, if it wished, to find elements that 
favor the secular character of a typical wedding ceremony, but that would 
likely prove unconvincing since the ceremony’s secular nature is certainly 
matched by its spiritual nature. 
 
 167 See id. at 235 (“Older religious displays and practices were at issue in McGowan, Marsh, Lynch, Van 
Orden, Pleasant Grove, and Buono, and the government won each time. Newer displays were at issue in Stone, 
Allegheny, and McCreary, and the government lost each time.”). 
 168 See GROSSBERG, supra note 22, at 76. 
 169 See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
 170 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (finding that a Virginia ban on interracial marriages 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (finding that a Texas 
criminal statute prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex” violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 171 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 235 (“Stone and McCreary characterized the Decalogue as a 
religious symbol and struck it down; Van Orden and Pleasant Grove characterized it as an historical marker 
and let it stand.”). 
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Third, government displays of religion that take place on private property 
fare better than displays of religion on government property.172 Because a 
wedding ceremony typically takes place on private property, one might think 
that the third factor weighs against a finding of establishment. Here, 
paradoxically, the fact that this government delegation of authority takes place 
overwhelmingly within the walls of churches would favor a finding of 
establishment. The reason for the reversal is evident when considering the 
nature of the symbol or practice in relation to its proper location: religious 
symbols most naturally belong on private property, whereas government 
authority most naturally should be exercised from within government agencies. 
Finally, the fourth factor is “whether the religious symbol or practice is 
offset by secular symbols or practices.”173 Here, there do not appear to be 
many secular symbols or practices to offset the religious nature of the 
ceremony. The fourth factor therefore likely weighs in favor of a finding of an 
establishment of religion or is a neutral factor at best. 
Altogether, the uncertainty of this line of cases174 and these four rules of 
thumb make clear that the “government display of religion” line of cases 
provides no safe haven for the practice of religious solemnization of civil 
marriage. The longstanding historical and cultural nature of the religious 
official’s role in marriage ceremonies makes for a compelling argument that it 
should not now be found to be an establishment of religion. Yet there is also 
the definite possibility a court could understand the radical new changes in 
marriage laws and norms to require a new understanding of the traditional role 
of religion in marriage. 
Thus, despite the possibility of a historical exception, governmental and 
religious functions are indeed fused, in violation of the Establishment Clause, 
at the solemnization of a civil marriage by a licensed religious official. This 
therefore constitutes an impermissible delegation of government authority to 
religion. 
This, however, does not mean that the nuptial world as we know it is 
ending; as Part IV demonstrates, narrow time, place, and manner regulations 
 
 172 See id. at 236 (“Government-sponsored displays on private property, as in Lynch, get more deference 
than private displays on government property, as in Stone and Allegheny.”). 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. at 237 (“Even a sympathetic reader of the Court’s modern establishment law is tempted to 
apply to it the definition that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once applied to the common law: ‘chaos with an 
index.’”). 
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are all that are required to cure this impermissible establishment of religion. 
These measures will not require religious officials to be stripped of their 
licenses nor require officials to abandon their historical role in the 
solemnization of civil marriages. In turning to solutions to these constitutional 
problems, however, Part IV begins by first setting forth solutions to the free 
exercise problem discussed previously. Part IV then details the time, place, and 
manner regulations needed to remedy the Establishment Clause violation just 
described. 
IV.  TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF A ROBUST RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
A. The Free Exercise Problem 
As discussed in Part II, a state may, consistent with the Free Exercise 
Clause, require its religious officials licensed to solemnize civil marriage to 
administer their licenses in a way that violates the dictates of their faiths.175 
Though this may be yet another unintended consequence of Smith, barring its 
death, any protection for religious officials must come from within its 
framework. These protections can therefore take two forms. First, Congress or 
the states can pass statutory exemptions explicitly protecting religious 
officials’ right to refuse to marry same-sex couples. Second, should Congress 
or state legislatures fail to pass statutory protections, religious communities 
will be able to avail themselves of judicially crafted remedies. 
1. Statutory Remedies 
The most apt remedy to this problem is the one already enacted in almost 
every state that has recognized same-sex marriage: a state statutory exemption 
protecting the right of religious officials to refuse to solemnize marriages 
against their conscience. But such legislative exemptions are not without 
controversy and are often subject to heated debate.176 As noted above, these 
exemptions are conspicuously absent in a few states.177 Moreover, if a state 
were to pass marriage solemnization antidiscrimination laws, it may not be 
inclined to pass such statutory protections. And while most states have already 
passed such conscience-protection statutes, the variances in coverage could 
 
 175 See supra Part II. 
 176 See Frank Gulino, A Match Made in Albany: The Uneasy Wedding of Marriage Equality and Religious 
Liberty, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 2012, at 38 (outlining the compromise and debate over New York’s conscience 
exemption to its same-sex marriage laws). 
 177 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 38 (2012); see also IOWA CODE § 595.10 (2014).  
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potentially lead to divergent interpretations by state courts.178 Therefore, the 
most expedient and comprehensive remedy available for religious communities 
is a federal conscience exemption.179 
Federal legislation aimed at protecting the right of religious officials to 
refuse to marry same-sex couples should therefore include the following: (1) a 
conscience clause protecting a religious official’s refusal according to his faith 
to solemnize same-sex marriages, (2) a clause disallowing any civil or criminal 
liability for such a refusal, and (3) a clause protecting the tax-exempt status of 
these refusing religious communities. These exemptions would prove 
comprehensive in protecting religious officials and their communities of faith. 
Additionally, these statutory exemptions raise no Establishment Clause 
concerns. In a long line of cases, most recently again affirmed in Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, the Supreme Court has recognized that targeted exemptions for the 
free exercise of religious adherents do not fall within the prohibition of the 
Establishment Clause.180 These protections would therefore be immune from 
an assault on their constitutionality. 
2. Judicial Remedies 
If Congress or state legislatures are unable or unwilling to pass statutory 
conscience protections for religious officials, religious litigants will be able to 
avail themselves of two judicially crafted exemptions, one of which comes 
from outside the Free Exercise Clause. The first is the expanded ministerial 
exception as laid down in Hosanna-Tabor.181 The second is the expressive 
association doctrine recognized in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.182 
a. An Expanded Ministerial Exception 
The ministerial exception had long been recognized by U.S. courts of 
appeals as an exception for religious institutions’ employment relationships 
with their ministers183 before being adopted by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-
 
 178 See Wilson, supra note 36, at 1509–11 (comparing statutory exemptions for clergy in several states). 
 179 Whether such a federal conscience exemption would violate the Tenth Amendment’s federalism 
protections is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 180 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005). 
 181 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 182 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 
 183 See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 & n.2. 
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Tabor.184 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that the ministerial exception 
applied to a church that had fired one of its “called teachers” when that teacher 
had filed a claim under the ADA against the church.185 Thus, what would have 
otherwise been retaliation was protected conduct under the ministerial 
exception.186 
Interestingly, the Court did not contest the fact that the ADA’s prohibition 
on retaliation was a neutral law of general applicability.187 Yet the Court 
distinguished Smith from this case by pointing out that Smith involved 
regulation of “only outward physical acts” of the religious.188 “The present 
case, in contrast,” the Court wrote, “concerns government interference with an 
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. 
The contention that Smith forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception 
rooted in the Religion Clauses has no merit.”189 
The Hosanna-Tabor decision is paradoxically both frighteningly open-
ended and narrow. The holding by its very words is limited to the decision by a 
church to fire a minister who had brought an employment discrimination suit 
against the church.190 But the Court in the next sentence states that it 
“express[es] no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, 
including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct 
by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the 
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”191 
Therefore, it appears as though the ministerial exception could be 
broadened to cover a religious official who objected to a law that would 
require the official to violate his or her conscience in solemnizing a same-sex 
marriage. To do so, the ministerial exception would first have to be broadened 
to cover not just the ability of a church to control who its ministers are. But 
certainly, whose marriages a minister solemnizes, with the spiritual authority 
and duty that a minister carries, is “an internal church decision that affects the 
faith and mission of the church itself.”192 And if “[t]he church must be free to 
 
 184 See id. at 706. 
 185 Id. at 706–07. 
 186 Id. at 706–09. 
 187 Id. at 707. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. (citation omitted). 
 190 Id. at 710. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 707. 
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choose those who will guide it on its way,”193 then the church should also be 
free to choose upon whose marriages it will extend its spiritual blessing. Thus, 
there is some chance that the ministerial exception could be expanded to cover 
decisions by churches concerning whose marriages a minister may, as the 
church’s representative and faith leader, solemnize or bless. 
This expansion of the ministerial exception would not be unprecedented. 
The Court itself in the Hosanna-Tabor decision, before adopting the 
ministerial exception, detailed prior precedents relating to government 
interference with internal church decisions to support the ministerial 
exception’s grounding within the First Amendment.194 The Court cited Watson 
v. Jones,195 in which the Court “declined to question” the determination of the 
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church that the antislavery faction of 
one of its churches controlled the property of that church’s location.196 The 
Court in that case wrote that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, 
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] 
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals 
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.”197 
Cited next is Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, in which the Court held that a New York law that required the Russian 
Orthodox Church in New York to recognize a decision of its North American 
governing body violated the Free Exercise Clause.198 In the third and final case 
cited, the Court held that the First Amendment “permit[s] hierarchical religious 
organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline 
and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these 
matters.”199 “When ecclesiastical tribunals decide such disputes,” the 
Hosanna-Tabor Court observed, “‘the Constitution requires that civil courts 
accept their decisions as binding upon them.’”200 
These cases provide a larger context for the ministerial exception and 
demonstrate that the Court recognizes that the Free Exercise Clause protects 
 
 193 Id. at 710. 
 194 Id. at 704–05. 
 195 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
 196 See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704. 
 197 See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. 
 198 See 344 U.S. 94, 120–21 (1952).  
 199 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976). 
 200 See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 725). 
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the ability of religious institutions to make their own decisions regarding 
internal issues of faith. 
Therefore, because the decision by a religious community to solemnize a 
marriage is an intimate, internal issue of faith and theology, the ministerial 
exception should be broadened to protect licensed religious officials and their 
communities. Marriage is a profoundly spiritual institution for many religious 
communities and their adherents. It is not entered into lightly; and for some, it 
is not exited easily either. If a faith is afforded the right to determine its 
questions of leadership and theology, it should also be afforded the right to 
withhold its sacrament or covenant of marriage from those whom it believes to 
be theologically unfit for the union. To cast the same in terms more natural to 
the ministerial exception, a religious community should not only be able to 
control who its ministers are, but to whom those ministers administer the 
privileges of their faith as well. 
b. The Expressive Association Doctrine 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment prevented the Boy Scouts from being forced to admit a gay scout 
leader into its leadership, as would be required under antidiscrimination 
laws.201 The Boy Scouts, the Court held, were protected by a right of 
expressive association under the First Amendment.202 A church or faith 
community should also be able to avail itself of this argument. Clearly, being 
forced to solemnize or celebrate a marriage contrary to the tenets of a religious 
official’s faith would burden the expression of that religious official’s faith as 
well as the faith of that official’s larger religious community (since the 
religious official, as noted above, is a representative and leader of that 
community). Lupu and Tuttle put it this way: “[A] proposition crucial to 
religious liberty is that religions, to maintain their integrity, must and do 
discriminate.”203 As a result, the argument would run, religious communities 
should be able to protect the integrity and public expression of their faiths by 
availing themselves of the same expressive association protection extended in 
Dale. 
 
 201 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000). 
 202 Id.  
 203 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 35, at 285. 
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But at issue in Dale was a private, voluntary association, merely 
incorporated by the state as a nonprofit.204 These religious officials, on the 
other hand, are recipients of state power—the license to marry. Does this put 
religious officials outside the protection of the expressive association doctrine? 
As noted in Part III, courts have held that faith-based organizations that 
receive money from the federal government cannot administer their funds in 
such a way as to discriminate on religious grounds or unduly proselytize.205 
Likewise, commercial entities are likely not protected by a similar 
associational freedom.206 But an objecting religious official, but for the 
extended license, would simply be a private entity; he or she receives no 
government money and does not operate as a commercial enterprise. 
Moreover, the larger religious community, in contrast to the singular licensed 
religious official as an individual, is virtually identical to the Boy Scouts in 
Dale: a private, voluntary association incorporated as a nonprofit.207 Thus, the 
religious community as a whole may be best able to assert the expressive 
association doctrine to protect itself and its individual licensed religious 
officials. 
Regardless, because a law requiring religious officials to solemnize 
marriages contrary to their faith would burden the expressive faith of (1) the 
religious official and (2) the larger religious community of which that official 
is a representative, courts should also extend the expressive association 
doctrine to protect religious officials and communities from any such laws. 
B. “Unfusing” the Establishment Problem 
As demonstrated in Part III, when a religious official enacts both civil and 
spiritual marriage in a single solemnization ceremony, he or she fuses 
governmental and religious functions.208 This fusion thus constitutes an 
impermissible establishment of religion. As discussed earlier, this is one reason 
why some call for the strict separation of church and state in marriage. 
 
 204 Dale, 530 U.S. at 649. 
 205 See supra Part III; see also Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then 
and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1605 (“Religious organizations . . . . may be pressured to become wholly 
secular in order to receive aid on a level playing field.”). 
 206 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 36, at 285 n.60 (citing a Minnesota case that did not grant a for-profit 
Christian health club the right to discriminate on the basis of religion). 
 207 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644. 
 208 See supra Part III. 
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But what if these two functions could be teased out—that is, unfused? 
Consider first whether the statute that licenses religious officials to marry 
individuals fuses governmental and religious functions by its very nature. The 
statute does not forbid a religious official to marry a couple in a purely 
religious or spiritual sense. Nor does it forbid that religious official from 
marrying a couple in only the legal or civic sense. Could a religious official 
then not “marry” a couple twice? These separate ceremonies or solemnizations 
would thus represent the separate functions of government and religion, 
unfused, with respect to marriage. This separation would in effect unfuse the 
impermissible delegation as forbidden in Larkin. 
A statute licensing religious officials to solemnize civil marriage is 
therefore akin to statutes that require the state certification of teachers to teach 
in religious schools. Certifying teachers to teach in religious schools does not 
ipso facto establish a religion.209 Moreover, the Supreme Court in McDaniel v. 
Paty held that a Tennessee statute that disqualified ministers from holding 
elected office was an unconstitutional violation of the minister’s free exercise 
rights.210 The Court’s brief analysis is worth quoting in full: 
Yet under the clergy-disqualification provision, McDaniel cannot 
exercise both rights simultaneously because the State has conditioned 
the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. Or, in James 
Madison’s words, the State is “punishing a religious profession with 
the privation of a civil right.” In so doing, Tennessee has encroached 
upon McDaniel’s right to the free exercise of religion. “[T]o 
condition the availability of benefits [including access to the ballot] 
upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of 
[his] religious faith [by surrendering his religiously impelled 
ministry] effectively penalizes the free exercise of [his] constitutional 
liberties.”211 
In effect, in McDaniel the Court recognized that ministers can wear two hats at 
the same time—those of both a citizen and a minister. 
A statute licensing a religious official may thus be naturally read to allow 
for a religious official to marry a couple both spiritually and legally, wearing 
 
 209 See, e.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 500 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding a teacher 
certification requirement as applicable to religious schools); see also Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Dep’t of 
Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1986); State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 
1981).  
 210 See 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978). 
 211 Id. (citations omitted).  
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the proverbial two hats yet again. Thus, the establishment problem created by 
states licensing religious officials to solemnize civil marriage is created not by 
the statute itself, but at the point of solemnization—that is, in the ceremony 
itself. 
Thus, what is needed is not strict separation but a clearer division in the 
solemnization ceremony between a religious official acting in his or her 
spiritual capacity and in his or her publicly licensed capacity. To accomplish 
this, Congress or state legislatures should enact narrow time, place, and 
manner regulations aimed at ensuring this clear division. These time, place, 
and manner regulations should require that two separate ceremonies be held for 
all marriages solemnized by a licensed religious official. A religious official 
could first marry a couple spiritually,212 and then in a second civil ceremony, 
held in a different location, marry the couple civilly. These regulations should 
also prohibit language invoking state authority in the spiritual ceremony and 
invocations of spiritual authority in the civil ceremony; for example, a 
religious official should no longer purport to marry a couple spiritually by the 
power vested in him or her by the state. 
These regulations would not be unique in the world. In fact, these 
regulations would be similar to what France and England require of their 
marriage ceremonies. For example, France requires a ceremony celebrated by a 
civil authority; a religious ceremony may or may not be held afterwards.213 
Likewise, in England, there are restrictions on where weddings can take place 
and, in a ceremony, on what words may be used.214 
Enacting regulations such as these would thus accomplish the necessary 
unfusing of governmental and religious functions to avoid an Establishment 
Clause violation. The religious official acts first only in his spiritual and 
private capacity. In this first ceremony, the religious official has carried out his 
or her spiritual function. Only once this spiritual power is fully exercised and 
finished altogether may the religious official then carry out his or her 
governmental function of solemnizing the couple’s civil marriage as required 
by law. There is a clear divide between the two functions, and no words are 
 
 212 See Deuteronomy 5:7 (King James) (“Thou shalt have none other gods before me.”). 
 213 See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 165 (Fr.).  
 214 See Marriage Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 76, § 44 (detailing the language to be used in the 
solemnization ceremony); Marriage Act, 1994, c. 34, § 1 (amending Marriage Act 1949 to allow for the 
approval of local premises for marriage solemnization). 
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spoken by the licensed religious official to compromise that divide. The 
Establishment Clause is thus satisfied. 
Aside from potential political resistance, these regulations would likely 
face two main legal challenges, both of which are ultimately unavailing. First, 
it could be argued that these regulations unduly burden a religious 
community’s free speech rights or (ironically) its free exercise rights. Second, 
it could be argued that these regulations foster an “excessive entanglement” 
between government and religion. 
As to the first argument, the Supreme Court has held that valid time, place, 
and manner restrictions that may burden an individual’s First Amendment 
rights are not unconstitutional.215 As long as these restrictions were passed in 
such a way as to apply generally and nondiscriminatorily (similar to Smith’s 
neutral and of general applicability rule), then they are likely to be valid time, 
place, and manner restrictions.216 
Moreover, even if these procedural safeguards were not found to be valid 
time, place, and manner regulations on public conduct, they would likely 
survive strict scrutiny. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, there is a threshold 
question of whether there is even a significant enough burden on free exercise 
to justify a cause of action.217 Under these restrictions, the burdens of having 
two separate ceremonies, in two separate locations, while only avoiding 
improper invocations of authority, are likely de minimis.218 
As to the second argument, these provisions do not lead to an 
impermissible “excessive entanglement” of government and religion. Recall 
that this excessive entanglement test comes from the third prong of the three-
prong test articulated first in Lemon v. Kurtzman.219 Specifically, the test 
requires that state policies do not foster “excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.”220 
 
 215 See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953) (upholding the “uniform, nondiscriminatory, 
and consistent administration of . . . licenses for public meetings”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 
(1940) (“[A] State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the 
manner of soliciting upon its streets . . . .”).  
 216 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.  
 217 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19, 725 (2004) (finding the exclusion of theology majors from 
state scholarship funding as only a “relatively minor burden”). 
 218 See id. at 725. 
 219 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 220 Id. at 609 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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To begin, it is unclear how the excessive entanglement test would be 
applied to these time, place, and manner regulations. Lemon and its progeny 
originally were focused on state funding of religious education.221 Moreover, 
Lemon’s separatist logic has been walked back considerably following the 
Equal Treatment line of cases culminating in the Court’s upholding of a state-
funded voucher program in which 96.6% of the voucher funding went to 
religious schools.222 The Lemon test has, however, been applied to cases 
outside the school funding context and primarily in the religious symbols 
context.223 
Yet the time, place, and manner regulations proposed in this Comment fall 
into neither category. There is no government funding at stake, and no 
symbolic featuring of religion in the public square. In fact, these regulations do 
the very opposite; they are designed to cure the true excessive entanglement of 
church and state—that is, their functional fusion in the wedding ceremony 
solemnized by a licensed religious official.224 
If an excessive entanglement claim were to be made, it would likely be 
made in connection with enforcing these regulations. But the enforcement of 
these regulations need not be any different than the enforcement of any other 
time, place, and manner restrictions that a religious institution is subject to. 
That a church is subject to building and fire codes does not create excessive 
entanglement.225 Thus, the enforcement of these provisions, unlike what some 
may fear, would not require the state to be best man at every wedding. 
Likewise, they would not result in excessive entanglement between church and 
state. 
 
 221 See id. at 606; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222 (1997); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 
832 (1973); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973). 
 222 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002); WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 95, at 
214–18. 
 223 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Lemon test “remains a 
required starting point in deciding contentions that state displays of symbols . . . are contrary to the First 
Amendment”), aff’d, 545 U.S. 677, 689 (2005). 
 224 See supra Part III. 
 225 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1989) (“[R]outine regulatory interaction 
which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine . . . and no ‘detailed monitoring and close administrative 
contact’ between secular and religious bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.” 
(citations omitted)).  
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CONCLUSION 
As noted in the Introduction and embodied in the discussion of these two 
competing problems, the First Amendment Religion Clauses “often exert 
conflicting pressures.”226 Here, the First Amendment simultaneously urges the 
protection of religious officials and their communities in the exercise of their 
licenses (through the Free Exercise Clause) while at the same time counseling 
either that those same licenses be taken away or exercised in a particularly 
acceptable manner (through the Establishment Clause). Yet this Comment has 
demonstrated that it is possible to arrive in the safe “corridor between the 
Religion Clauses”227 for this issue of religious officials licensed to solemnize 
civil marriage. 
As to the first issue of religious officials seeking the protection of the Free 
Exercise Clause, this Comment has demonstrated, paradoxically, that for 
licensed religious officials, the Free Exercise Clause does not provide an 
exemption to a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
in the administration of marriage solemnization licenses. Any such 
antidiscrimination law would likely be found to be neutral and of general 
applicability. As a result, any protection from these laws for licensed religious 
officials must come from statutory or judicial exemptions. First and foremost, a 
federal conscience exemption for religious officials who refuse to solemnize 
same-sex marriages would be the most effective and efficient solution. But in 
the absence of such a statutory exemption, licensed religious officials and their 
larger faith communities should be able to claim the protections of an 
expanded ministerial exception and the expressive association doctrine. 
As to the establishment issue created by states licensing religious officials 
to solemnize civil marriages, this Comment has demonstrated that while these 
statutes do not establish a religion, there is an impermissible fusion of 
governmental and religious functions at the point of solemnization—that is, in 
the ceremony itself. This fusion of governmental and religious functions is also 
unlikely to be protected by the longstanding historical and cultural practice 
exception. Remedying this establishment problem, however, does not require a 
strict separationist approach. Indeed, stripping religious officials of their 
licenses to solemnize civil marriages would be to discount the faith of (1) the 
religious individuals to be wed, (2) the religious officials themselves, and (3) 
the larger religious communities of which these two groups are a part. Thus, 
 
 226 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
 227 Id. at 720. 
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this Comment has proposed narrow time, place, and manner regulations 
intended to unfuse the governmental and religious functions at civil wedding 
ceremonies solemnized by religious officials. These regulations require two 
separate ceremonies, at two different times and places, while prohibiting 
language that confuses the authorities invoked in either ceremony. 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that these regulations would also 
survive constitutional challenge. 
If this Comment’s thesis were adopted, much work would need to be done. 
As to the free exercise issue, states need to preempt any nondiscrimination 
laws by passing specific statutory exemptions protecting religious officials. 
However, if a state does not pass statutory exemptions, courts should expand 
the ministerial exception and the expressive association doctrine to protect 
licensed religious officials. 
As to the Establishment Clause issue, however, every state could face an 
imminent action against the fusion of governmental and religious functions at 
the typical marriage ceremony solemnized by a licensed religious official. 
Thus, there is the possibility of an impending political maelstrom, 
encompassing litigants, states, and religious communities. As a result of a 
lawsuit, these communities would be thrust into a conversation about the 
modern meaning of the Establishment Clause and its interpretation in Larkin 
and its progeny. In the end, the narrow time, place, and manner restrictions this 
Comment proposes would provide the most simple and narrow means by 
which to remedy the establishment violation. Thus, religious communities 
should be receptive of these measures to avoid the alternative strict separation 
solution. 
In setting forth these arguments, this Comment has sought to uphold both 
of the necessary bastions of religious liberty enshrined in the First 
Amendment. On the one hand, this Comment has advocated for the protection 
of the religious liberty of religious officials to solemnize only those marriages 
allowed by their faith. On the other hand, this Comment has argued for the 
protection of religious liberty that the Establishment Clause affords to all 
individuals—that no faith should be entitled to an establishment of religion. 
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